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Abstract
Background: Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) in the genome has become crucial information for clinical use.
For example, the targeted cancer therapy is primarily based on the information which clinically important SNPs are
detectable from the tumor. Many hospitals have developed their own panels that include clinically important SNPs.
The genome information exchange between the patient and the hospital has become more popular. However, the
genome sequence information is innate and irreversible and thus its leakage has serious consequences. Therefore,
protecting one’s genome information is critical. On the other side, hospitals may need to protect their own panels.
There is no known secure SNP panel scheme to protect both.
Results: In this paper, we propose a secure SNP panel scheme using homomorphically encrypted K-mers without
requiring SNP calling on the user side and without revealing the panel information to the user. Use of the powerful
homomorphic encryption technique is desirable, but there is no known algorithm to efficiently align two
homomorphically encrypted sequences. Thus, we designed and implemented a novel secure SNP panel scheme
utilizing the computationally feasible equality test on two homomorphically encrypted K-mers. To make the scheme
work correctly, in addition to SNPs in the panel, sequence variations at the population level should be addressed. We
designed a concept of Point Deviation Tolerance (PDT) level to address the false positives and false negatives. Using
the TCGA BRCA dataset, we demonstrated that our scheme works at the level of over a hundred thousand somatic
mutations. In addition, we provide a computational guideline for the panel design, including the size of K-mer and the
number of SNPs.
Conclusions: The proposed method is the first of its kind to protect both the user’s sequence and the hospital’s
panel information using the powerful homomorphic encryption scheme. We demonstrated that the scheme works
with a simulated dataset and the TCGA BRCA dataset. In this study, we have shown only the feasibility of the proposed
scheme and much more efforts should be done to make the scheme usable for clinical use.
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Background
Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) is crucial infor-
mation in medical sciences than ever before. A single
aberrant nucleotide variation can incur dysfunction in
a biological process, affecting individual vulnerability to
certain diseases. Hence, SNP existence can be utilized
to diagnose diseases. Sometimes, SNPs help determine
effective treatment, especially in cancer. From The Cancer
Genome Atlas (TCGA) project, numerous driver muta-
tions are reported in many cancer types [1] and panels
using the curated mutation information have been devel-
oped [2]. Furthermore, genetic disorders in Mendelian
diseases are very well studied [3] and thus SNP detection
can be directly translated into the contribution to actual
medical applications. Because of the importance of SNPs
to disease, the US NIH has compiled a database called
ClinVar [4].
The utility of SNPs goes beyond the medicine domain.
People are diverse in the genomic content, thus the dif-
ference in genomic content among people can be used to
identify a specific person. For such reason, SNPs are often
used for legal and forensic purposes. There are Direct-
to-Customer SNP kits that are designed for non-medical
use such as pedigree search. More people measure their
genomes and use the information for various purposes.
As genomic data are widely used and disclosed, a poten-
tial threat to genomic privacy is a serious problem. DNA
sequence is a blueprint of a human being since the infor-
mation includes not only medical conditions but to the
extent of even reconstructing facial model which is one of
the most sensitive information of human being [5]. Our
knowledge on the human genome is very limited as of
now and much more information encoded in the genome
will be disclosed over the years. Thus, genomic informa-
tion is critical and will cause severe damage to individuals
if leaked. This could also lead to a social crisis because
genomic data can be used to justify discrimination among
people. Unlike other confidential data, genomic data are
innate and immutable, making the damage irreversible
and permanent throughout one’s lifetime. Due to its far-
reaching and sensitive nature, the genomic data is prone
to be monetized. For these reasons, It is very important to
protect the genomic information from hackers, insurance
establishments, hospitals, pharmaceuticals, government
and all the possible threats yet to come.
Among recent measures to protect data, homomorphic
encryption is a technology that gains attention recently.
It refers to an encryption scheme that allows the third
party to perform computations while not knowing any
content of the original source data or the private key. If
such computation includes addition and multiplication,
then theoretically all computations can be performed and
that is called fully homomorphic encryption. The result of
the computation is also returned encrypted, thus the third
party can provide its inference based on the data and at
the same time cannot know the data content or perform
inference at all. The first fully homomorphic encryption
scheme is proposed by Gentry at 2009 [6], and continually
improved its efficiency.
For example, consider that Alice is running a company
and Bob provides a cloud storage service. Alice stores her
encrypted data on Bob’s cloud. When Alice wants to com-
pute aggregate data, an average revenue per month for
instance, she has to decrypt the data if it is traditionally
encrypted. Decrypting on the cloud storage may reveal
both the private key and the source data to Bob. Down-
loading the encrypted data to local and decrypting it goes
against the purpose of utilizing cloud service in the first
place. This is when homomorphic encryption comes use-
ful. If the data is homomorphically encrypted, Alice does
not have to decrypt the source data on Bob’s cloud to do
the computation needed. Instead, the encrypted form of
aggregate data can be computed as ciphertexts and down-
loaded to Alice’s computer, and then safely decrypted.
This way, Alice can exploit Bob’s resource to compute the
average revenue without giving any information to Bob.
In more formal notation, an encryption scheme is addi-
tive homomorphic encryption if and only if
∀p ∀q ∃ : E(p)  E(q) = E(p + q)
given plaintexts p, q, and E(·) an encryption procedure.
E(p + q) denotes a ciphertext that can be decrypted
to plaintext p + q with the private key. Multiplicative
homomorphic encryption works likewise.
Related work
Given the importance of genome information, there has
recently been active research on genome security. Naveed
et al. [7] presented the history of genomics and related
privacy issues including the homomorphic encryption.
Dowlin et al. [8] also demonstrated how homomorphic
encryption and security could be used in the fields of
bioinformatics. In detail, we categorize recent genomic
security research works into three major groups: (1) dif-
ferential privacy, (2) secure system design with traditional
encryption scheme and (3) homomorphic encryption
scheme.
Differential privacy includes de-identification, which
refers to making genomic data unidentifiable by either
anonymizing or discarding personally differential infor-
mation. This aims to perturb the information so that any
leak of data itself would not possibly lead to identifying the
patient. However, it is shown in many papers that generic
de-identification techniques are not powerful enough to
prevent reconstructing identity [9–13]. To mitigate the
risk, many improvements weremade based on the domain
knowledge of the genomic data [14–19].
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The secure system design with traditional encryption
focuses on controlling the flow of sensitive information.
It relies on secret sharing of private keys with multiple
parties that do not collude to ensure the confidentiality
of the data. Canim et al. [20] suggested secure operations
based on a cryptographic coprocessor. Kamm et al. [21]
adopted multiple third parties to securely perform GWAS
analyses in a distributed way. On the other hand, Xie et al.
[22] proposed a statistical approach called meta-analysis
to recall aggregate features with reduced privacy risks. In
the work of Wang et al. [23], secure and efficient com-
putation of genomic edit distance and querying similar
sequence based on that is introduced.
The application of homomorphic encryption dates back
only to few years since it is a new technology. Troncoso-
Pastoriza et al. [24] proposed error resilient private string
search algorithm that is specially designed for DNAs using
homomorphic encryption. Kantarcioglu et al. [25] also
adopted homomorphic encryption to securely share the
aggregate data of genome sequence among researchers.
Ayday et al. [26, 27] proposed methods to query the
disease susceptibility with clinical data encrypted. More
recently, Kim et al. [28] showed that homomorphic
encryption can be used to obtain minor allele frequencies,
χ2 statistic in GWAS and edit distance of sequences in a
secure way. Lu et al. [29] and Zhang et al. [30] encrypted
phenotype and genotype homomorphically and then was
able to infer typical GWAS statistic. On the other hand,
Wang et al. adopted homomorphic encryption on rare
variants to perform homomorphic exact logistic regres-
sion [31]. Raisaro et al. [32] showed retrieving aggregate
data computed under homomorphically encrypted data
that is deployed to real world application on i2b2 data
warehouse. Jagadeesh et al. [33] also have shown secure
SNP data sharing between hospitals to induce meaningful
inference of disease. Other most recent works on homo-
morphic encryption include the works of Jacquez et al.
[34], Ghasemi et al. [35], and Cheng et al [36].
As described above, research on genomic privacy has
been active and advanced significantly over the years.
However, current research has been conducted assum-
ing situations with some compromises. De-identification
more or less manipulates the content of data and thus has
possibility to contaminate the original information. The
secure system design distributes the secret key and the
computation to multiple third parties. However, either the
trust or the resources for computing may not be avail-
able in reality. If the third parties are untrustworthy, they
may collude to jeopardize the private system. Likewise,
the shortage of resources such as storage, bandwidth and
processing power is critical for such system to maintain.
Even the works with homomorphic encryptions have
their own limitations, due to its inefficient nature. Most
applications [25–27, 30–32] encrypt a clean, annotated
SNP existence information on the user side or clinic data
as a plaintext. In this case, SNP calling should be done on
the user side and then the SNP calling information is sent
to the hospital. Some applications send sequences to the
hospital [25–29, 37]. In this case, the querying result is
limited to aggregate genomic data and clinical data. How
to use these techniques for a secure SNP panel has not
been explored.
Motivation and contribution
In this paper, we propose a patient-to-hospital SNP panel
scheme and its architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. In our
two party model, the patient has one’s raw sequence and
the private key, and the hospital has computing power
and the SNP panel. SNP panel refers to a tool owned by the
hospital that can find the specific combination of SNPs.
A possible scenario is that the patient sends the raw
sequence to the hospital to detect SNP existence. In
order to protect data from being stolen in the mid-
dle, the transferring raw sequence must be encrypted.
In traditional patient-to-hospital model, the sequence is
encrypted using the hospital’s public key. This method
reveals the patient’s raw sequence. On the other hand,
with homomorphic encryption, the patient can send the
raw sequence encrypted with his/her own public key. Plus,
the homomorphic nature of encryption allows the hos-
pital to match encrypted sequence with its SNP panels
without the private key or knowing the raw sequence.
Another thing to note is that, homomorphic encryp-
tion is slow and expensive that it cannot be applied to
raw sequence for practical usage due to its computational
inefficiency. In addition, although additive andmultiplica-
tive homomorphic encryption schemes is considered fully
homomorphic in theory, its functionality is limited in
reality due to their computationally demanding nature.
Thus, using domain knowledge of genomic sequence, we
devise a patient-to-hospital communication protocol onto
which homomorphic encryption is applicable in order to
securely detect SNPs without revealing the patient’s raw
sequence and the hospital’s SNP panel assets to each other.
Thus, we propose a secure SNP panel scheme using
homomorphically encrypted K-mers without SNP call-
ing on the user side. The major challenge is that there
is no known algorithm to align two homomorphically
encrypted sequences as whole. The basic idea to overcome
this challenge is to utilize the equality testing operation
on two homomorphically encrypted K-mers that is com-
putationally feasible under the homomorphic encryption
scheme. The major features of our scheme is as below:
1 We introduce a secure scheme that uses
homomorphically encrypted K-mer, a short
subsequence of the raw sequence, and show that
encrypted K-mers can detect SNPs as good as the raw
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Fig. 1 The traditional and homomorphic SNP detection scheme. In this figure, E(·) andD(·) denote encryption and decryption respectively.
Encryption needs public key while decryption needs private key. The subscript refers to the owner of the private key. For example, Ehos(·) means the
data is encrypted with hospital’s public key thus only the hospital can decrypt it. a demonstrates traditional way of detecting SNP. 1© The patient
gives the hospital the raw sequence. In order to protect data from being stolen in the middle, the sequence is encrypted using the hospital’s public
key. 2© The hospital decrypts patient sequence and performs computation to detect SNP. 3© The hospital returns the SNP existence information
encrypted with the patient’s public key to the patient. 4© The patient can decrypt and get the SNP information. b on the other hand, demonstrates
the same SNP detection scheme in homomorphic way. 1© The patient sends one’s encrypted raw sequence but this time with the public key. 2©
Due to its homomorphic property, the hospital can perform computations on the sequence only with the public key, without decrypting the
sequence. 3© The result is acquired in encrypted form, and the hospital returns the result to patient not knowing its content. 4© The patient can
decrypt the result in secure environment
sequence does under certain conditions. With
properly tuned value of K, exploiting K-mer can
achieve small error bounds and practical runtime at
the same time.
2 Our method considers genome variations among
individuals. We assayed TCGA breast cancer patient
data to estimate individual variation ratio. We
further define and compute false positive rate and
false negative rate of our SNP detection scheme and
either suggest a method to control or show that the
error is bounded to an ignorable value.
3 Our contribution is also to the extent of providing a
SNP panel design guideline. When a hospital selects
SNP residues for the diagnosis of a certain disease
and wants to use our secure SNP panel scheme, our
method suggests guidelines on which SNP residues
under consideration can be used.
Methods
Data description and panel preprocessing
In actual clinical case, a SNP panel consists of multiple
SNP residues, where each SNP residue corresponds to a
pre-determined disease-associated SNP residue (Fig. 1).
A targeted DNA sequencing is then performed to assess
SNP status of each residue.
For our study, we generated a synthesized dataset that
simulates the aforementioned case. In the dataset, the SNP
residues are randomly sampled from coding sequences of
the hg19 reference genome [38], where refSeq gene anno-
tation is used to specify coding regions (downloaded from
UCSC genome database [39]). First, we chose 1000 SNP
residues sampled from the hg19 genome, then randomly
combined them into various size of panels. As a result, we
generated panels having 10, 20, ..., 100 residues randomly
selected from the pool of 1000 SNP residues. Hence, 10
different SNP panels of size ranging from 10 to 100 were
generated.
After combining 10 different SNP panels, we simu-
lated a massive parallel sequencing data (or DNA-seq)
usingWgSim. From the 1300 bp length flanking sequences
(650 bp for each side) from each SNP residue, short-
read sequences (151 bp × 2) were simulated. Here, the
1300 bp and “151 bp × 2” parameters were set to simu-
late the actual targeted short-read sequencing condition.
The exact parameter for WgSim is “-e 0 -1 151 -2 151
-r 0 -R 0 -X 0 -S 0 -N [VAR]”, where all the parame-
ters for random sequencing errors are set to none and
the throughput parameter “-N” depends on the size of
each panel. The sequencing depth was set to 10, meaning
that 10 sequencing reads are expected to cover each SNP
residue in average. So, to cover more residues, it requires
more sequencing reads to simulate (hence larger “-N”).
Lastly, each residue has 50% chance of nucleotide sub-
stitution to simulate SNPs by design. For instance, if we
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check any SNP residue, we can expect to find 5 reads
having reference allele and other 5 reads having variant
allele as planted. In summary, we generated 10 DNA-
seq data corresponding to 10 SNP panels having different
combination of SNP residues, each having average 50%
substitution rate.
There could be unwanted overlap of flanking sequences
between two different SNP residues. The overlap between
two SNP residues would require a large value K. Therefore,
we either merge the overlapped residues or discard one
of them. This problem is described in Fig. 2. If two SNP
residues are fully overlapped without mismatch, we merge
them into a single entityhaving extended flanking sequences
to prevent unnecessary long search for Ks. And if not, we
randomly chose one residue and discarded the other one.
To avoid promiscuous merging, we set the cutoff for fully
overlap situation to 100 bp. Assuming a uniform random
distribution, the probability that two flanking sequences
overlap 100 bp by chance is 1 − (1 − 2 · 4−100)2 . The
computed p-value is negligible. Therefore, it is safe to
merge the residues satisfying this condition. However, if
an extreme case occurs that flanking sequences of two
SNP residues overlap more than 150 bp, which is longer
than short-read length, we treat them same as the case of
partial overlap situation, hence they are discarded.
The handling of overlapping sequence enables that, even
if more than two SNP residues exist near, possibly within
the range of K so that there exists a K-mer which has
both SNPs, the proposed SNP panel scheme finds both
Fig. 2 Two possible cases where different SNP residues have an
overlap in their flanking sequences. There can be two different cases
where an overlapping occurs between flanking sequences of two
different SNP residues. a Fully overlapped without mismatch, b
Partially overlapped with mismatch. In case of (a), two SNP residues
are merged into a single sequence to prevent unnecessary long
search for K’s. However, in case of (b), we randomly chose one residue
and discarded the other one
SNPs correctly. It only has to enumerate all possible K-
mers and perform equality test on the user K-mers with
corresponding SNP labels.
Now we have a panel that will be used for testing our
secure SNP scheme. The panel should be designed by
doctors for a specific disease. What we have shown is a
computational scheme to test whether a panel with many
residues can be used with our secure SNP panel scheme
that is proposed in this paper.
Workflow: a bird’s eye view
The goal of this paper is to propose a patient-to-hospital
secure communication protocol such that a patient would
conceal its genome sequence while requesting SNP detec-
tions to a hospital with a panel. Specifically, we are inter-
ested in separating access between to the SNP panel at the
hospital and to the genomic sequence of the patient. The
SNP panel information is an asset of the hospital which
may not be revealed to the public. On the other hand, the
user does not want the hospital to know one’s sequence.
The goal is to protect both.
In our scheme illustrated in Fig. 3, the patient has
one’s raw genomic sequence and the hospital has
panel sequence. To apply homomorphic encryption to
sequences, we chunk both the raw sequence of the
patient and the panel sequence of the hospital into K-
mers. In other words, we get K-mers from substring of
the sequences with a sliding window of stride 1, size K.
What we want to do is encrypt K-mers and perform
homomorphic equality tests on two K-mers. The patient
would receive an encrypted result of SNP calling from
the hospital. If a K-mer from patient sequence matches
a K-mer from the panel sequence annotated with a spe-
cific SNP, the patient can tell which SNP one has. Further
medical diagnosis can be done based on the test result.
Note that the patient encrypts the K-mers and holds
the private key so that the hospital does not gain any
information about the patient’s sequence. Meanwhile, the
computation is done on the hospital’s side, securing SNP
panel assets from leakage.
K-mer design
Our SNP detection scheme works under specific con-
ditions. To determine SNP existence by performing
K-mer equality testing, the corresponding K-mer should
be unique throughout the whole SNP panel sequences.
Otherwise, K-mer matching cannot guarantee the exis-
tence of SNP. Thus the core idea of K-mer design is to
set K long enough for all K-mers that contain any panel
SNP to be distinguishable. However, while long K ensures
unique K-mers, longer K-mers will be computationally
expensive.
Therefore, given a panel we computed panel-specific
minimum value of K such that all K-mers in the panel
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Fig. 3 The overall architecture of our new SNP detection scheme. This figure depicts the general process of proposed SNP detection scheme. The set
of panel sequences noted in yellow and the patient genome sequence noted in blue are chunked down into K-mers, respectively. After we encrypt
K-mers, the client-side patient’s encrypted K-mers are transmitted to the server. The black box depicted in the middle denotes the homomorphic
evaluation procedure. Here, we check the matching correspondence between any member in panel K-mer set and in the patient K-mer set. The
result noted green is returned to the patient. The patient can decrypt the result with the private key securely on the client-side environment
that have a SNP are distinct. To achieve this goal, first
K-merize all panel sequences and group them into two
sets: (A) K-mers with SNPs and (B) K-mers without. Then,
following conditionsmust hold for K-mers with SNPs to be
distinct.
1 K-mers in set (A) are unique (have no duplicate)
2 K-mers in set (B) do not appear in set (A)
Among the Ks that satisfy the above conditions, the mini-
mum value is chosen.
False positive/negative errors
In our system, K of K-mer is defined to make all K-mers
distinguishable and thus no false positive or negative
errors. However, we assumed that individual patient
sequence derived from SNP panel varies only at the inter-
ested SNP residue and the flanking sequences are identical
for all patients. This is not the case when the variations
at the population level are considered. An actual sequence
derived by SNP panel may present unannotated devia-
tions from what is known to the panel, other than SNP
residues in it. Examples include point mutation, individual
genome variation and sequencing errors. Presence of such
deviations may result in false positive and false negative
errors. False positive error occurs when the scheme iden-
tifies a K-mer and declares a SNP existence but actually
the patient does not have one. False negative error occurs
when the patient indeed has a SNP yet the scheme fails
to detect one. We henceforth refer to point deviation as a
single nucleotide deviation from intended panel sequence,
resulting from either point mutation, individual variation
or sequencing error.
False positive occurs when the determined K-mer did
not originate from the flanking sequence around the
found SNP. Rather, it originated from other irrelevant
parts of patient genome sequence that correspond to any
other SNP residue in the processing panel. To deal with
false positive errors, we devised Point Deviation Toler-
ance (PDT) level. Previously in the process of computing
K, we had two conditions on K-mers. Both conditions uti-
lized the equality test to check uniqueness of K-mers in
(A) and exclusiveness of K-mers in (A) over those in (B).
We generalize the equality test to the hamming distance
check with its lower bound being PDT. In other words, we
apply strict rules and regard similar sequences ambigu-
ous. Here, being similar is defined by PDT point devia-
tions. The uniqueness condition is the specific case of
PDT being 0. Thus we can rewrite the K-mer conditions as
below:
1 K-mers in set (A) are distinct (any pairs’ hamming
distance greater than PDT)
2 K-mers in set (B) are distinct from K-mers in set (A)
Given PDT, one can determine aminimum value K satisfy-
ing the updated conditions. PDT works as a safety margin
to K-mer ambiguity. The point deviation, namely the sum
of point mutations, individual variation and sequencing
errors, is allowed up to maximum PDT. Therefore, if the
aggregate point deviation occurs less than or equal to
PDT, false positive cases do not appear.
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On the contrary, we cannot prevent false negative cases.
False negative happens when the system cannot determine
a SNP when it is truly in the patient’s sequence. The major
cause of this is also the point deviation in the sequences
flanking a SNP. It is infeasible to prepare all the variant
K-mers as we did to cope with the false positive errors.
In this paper, we assayed TCGA BRCA data to determine
the distance distribution of somatic mutations among
patients. Based on the data, we estimate the probability of
a point mutation lying on K-mers to estimate false negative
errors.
RLWE cryptosystem
In this paper, we used HEAAN (Homomorphic Encryp-
tion for Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers) library to
implement the equality test on two homomorphically
encrypted K-mers. HEAAN is based on RLWE (Ring-
Learning With Error) encryption scheme. RLWE is a vari-
ation of LWE (Learning With Error) problem, which is
a lattice-based cryptography. LWE exploits its hardness
assumption to ensure security which follows:
a←Znq , s←Znq , e←χn, r1, r2←Znq : (a, 〈a, s〉+e)≈c(r1, r2)
In other words, for some secret key s and some error
distribution χ , the relation between a and 〈a, s〉 + e are
computationally indistinguishable from random numbers.
RLWE uses polynomial integer rings instead of vectors.
Namely, Znq s are replaced with Zq[X] /m(X) for n =
φ(m), where (·) is cyclotomic polynomial and φ(·) is
Euler’s phi function. RLWE is estimated to achieve equal
or less level of security compared to LWE. Other parame-
ters for the scheme are p for message modulus, q cipher-
text modulus and ring R = Z/M(X) for integer M. We
further denote by Rq = R/qR and χ for error distribution.
The scheme for cryptography used throughout this paper
is described in detail below.
SKGen(params) Choose random s(X) ← χ , and set sk =

s = (1, s) ∈ R2q.
PKGen(params, sk) Choose random a(X), a′(X) ← Rq,
e(X), e′(X) ← χ , and set b(X) = −a(X)s(X) +
pe(X) ∈ Rq and b′(X) = −a′(X)s′(X) + pe′(X) ∈ Rq.
The public key is pk = (b, a) ∈ R2 and the evaluation
key is evk = (b′ + ps2, a′) ∈ Rq.
Enc(pk,m ∈ Rp) Choose v(X), e0(X), e1(X) ← χ and
let c1(X) = m(X) + v(X)b(X) + pe0(X), c2(X) =
v(X)a(X) + pe1(X). Return 
c = (c1, c2) ∈ R2q.
Dec(sk, 










c2, evk) For 
c1 = (b1, a1) and 
c2 = (b2, a2).
Return 
cmult = (b1b2, b1a2 +b2a1)+a1a2 · evk ∈ Rq.
RLWE-based homomorphic encryption supports batch-
ing (or SIMD) encoding and data array movement. If we
call the each element of data array as slot, the scheme
has permutation of message slots. This functionality can
be used to make our homomorphic evaluation algorithm
more efficient and split and merge DNA information.










c,X → Xk , KSsk(Xk)→sk(X)
)
Data encoding and encryption
To perform equality tests of K-mers in numerical system,
we regard each K-mer as a quaternary number via map-
ping each nucleobase A, C, G, T to 0, 1, 2, 3, respectively
and encode K-mers into integers. In this view, for example,
if "GACT" is a K-mer of length 4, then it corresponds to
K = 2013(4) = 2 × 43 + 0 × 42 + 1 × 41 + 3 = 135.
However, encoding DNA sequence of length L wholly
as an integer is inefficient when L is large, requiring a
huge set of scheme parameters. To achieve a better per-
formance, we suggest a method of breaking K-mers into
smaller blocks of same length and performing equality
tests for each block simultaneously. Henceforth for N
user-side K-mers and M panel-side K-mers divided into B
blocks respectively, we denote the data as following:
• n-th user-side K-mer : K (n)usr , or K (n) when obvious.
(n = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1)
• m-th panel-side K-mer : K (m)ref (m = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1)
• b-th block of K (n)usr : K (n)usr [b], or K (n)[b] when obvious.
(b = 0, 1, · · · ,B − 1)
• size of a block: L
Once the set of user-side K-mers is ready, we can encode


















1, if i = K (n)[b] ·N + n for some n ∈[N]
0, otherwise .
Here, we choose the dimension of vector slots by
smallest power of 2 which does not exceed 4L · N , or
the maximum of K (n)[b] ·N + n. It is noteworthy that
K (n)[b] ·N+n = K (m)[b] ·N+m if and only if n = m, since
n,m < N .
HEAAN supports a technique to pack k complex num-
bers in a single polynomial using a variant of the complex
canonical embedding map φ : Ck → R. We make
use of the technique and encrypt each of 
vb’s as a single
ciphertext 
cb. An example of parallel K-mer encryption is
depicted in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4 A detailed example to how multiple K-mers are encoded into vectors in parallel. This figure depicts how K-mers are divided into small blocks
and then encrypted to vectors. In this example, two 6-mers K(0) = CATCAT and K(1) = CATGTA are encoded into B = 3 blocks each of size L = 2 to
reduce the size of ciphertext space. Here, the value of slots is a power of 2 bounded by (42) · 2. The subscript b of 
vb indicates the index of blocks
encoded starting from 0. The values of elements in the vectors are indicators to Kn[ b]= i − n
2







v2[ 49] are 1’s. The vectors [ 
vb] are encrypted into polynomials [ 
cb] and then rotated by corresponding value of K(m)ref . This rotation ensures that
the first N blocks indicate the agreement of N b-th block of K-mers and b-th block of K(m)ref . Later, these values are multiplied in component-wise
manner. Therefore, 
d[ n] indicates 1 if n-th K-mer agrees with K(m)ref in all B blocks and 0 if any pair of blocks from both K-mers does not match
Homomorphic equality test of K-mers
In the proposed system, encrypted K-mers are compared
in homomorphic way to detect SNPs. The evaluation
operation consists of following steps.
Step 1: The HEAAN scheme supports the rotation oper-
ation on plaintext slots, i.e., it enables us to securely
obtain an encryption of the shifted plaintext vec-
tor (wr , . . . ,wk−1,w0, . . . ,wr−1) from an encryption of
(w0, . . . ,wk−1). We denote the rotation operation as
Rotate(
c; r). It outputs a ciphertext 
cr encrypting the
rotated plaintext vector of 






cb;N · K (m)ref [b]
)
.
Note that for n ∈[N], 
cb,m[n] is 1 if K (n)[b]= K (m)ref [b]
and 0 otherwise.









denotes component-wise multiplication. Note
that for n ∈[N], 
dm[n] is 1 if K (n) = K (m)ref and 0 otherwise.







Note that for n ∈[N], 
d[n] is the number of m such that
K (n)[b]= K (m)ref [b]. However, it is very unlikely Kref to have
multiple identical subsequences. Wemay assume that Kref
does not have multiple identical subsequences. If this is
the case, 
d[n] has the value 1 if K (n) = K (m)ref for some m
and 0 if not.










Note that the 0th component of 
cres is the encryption
of what we wanted: the number of n satisfying K (n) =
K (m)ref for some m ∈[L]. The fact can be seen by an easy
computation below.
















As mentioned in the subsection “False positive/negative
errors”, the false positive risk of our model can be
controlled to some extent by setting a PDT parame-
ter. Therefore, we focused on evaluating the false neg-
ative risk by performing an additional experiment. In
our model, false negative occurs if a patient has indi-
vidual sequence variations near the panel SNPs. Unlike
the conventional unencrypted mutation-calling proce-
dure allowing few mismatches, our model depends on
the equality test process, which always needs perfect
matching nearby the panel SNPs. Therefore, even a sin-
gle unexpected variation neighboring a panel SNP can
sabotage the calling of the residue. Considering the preva-
lent somatic mutations observed in cancer patients, we
can consider it as a major source of risk. Therefore, we
tested the false negative risk caused by somatic muta-
tions by using residues having mutations in actual breast
cancer patients, where the data is provided by TCGA
BRCA [40]. By this test, we estimated the empirical
probability of false negative risk in various experimental
conditions.
We collected 116,607 somatic mutations from TCGA
BRCA dataset, then computed the distribution of pairwise
distances between two mutations in terms of chromo-
somal positions. The goal of this test is to estimate the
probability that any two mutations are located in proxim-
ity by chance. We set the threshold of proximity as 32 bp,
which requires at least 32 bp as K-mer size to avoid false
positive SNP calling.Wewill discuss about K-mer size later
in detail. For now, the total number of all possible SNP





= 6, 798, 537, 921
and thus the probability P of a panel with N SNP




1 − 1, 308
6, 798, 537, 921
)(N2)
. (1)
Table 1 shows the probability of false negative risk cal-
culated by aforementioned formula (Eq. 1). The result
indicates that even though the risk gradually increases
as the size of panels grows, the false positive risk still
remains insignificant evenwhen it reaches to 100 residues.
It means that our model can handle panels having large
size without significant false negative risk.
As shown in Table 1, the false negative risk of our
model caused by somatic mutation is not significant. Even













N indicates the number of residues selected from 116,607 somatic mutations. P
indicates the probability that any two residues are located in 32 bp window. Note
that P still remains insignificant even when the N reaches to 100. All numbers are
rounded down to 2 significant figures
though there can be other source of risks that we did not
consider such as germline variations, the chance of false
negative caused by germline variation is relatively small
compared to the one caused by somatic mutation [41, 42].
Although a SNP residue of interest has a sequence vari-
ation in its flanking sequence, there are other adjacent
K-mers that might still detect the residue. Only whenmore
than two sequence variations are simultaneously occurred
and located in K bp on both sides of the panel residue, the
scheme completely fails. Hence the actual hazard of false
negative is expected to be small in practice. Moreover,
even if the false negative error occurs, the system can still
know the occurrence of it because there would be no posi-
tive count for that SNP residue at all. Therefore, the model
can easily detect false negative errors and can recommend
to avoid fatal situations.
Running time of the proposed panel scheme
In our model, one of the major factors that determine
running time is the PDT level. As mentioned, PDT level
indicates the tolerance for mismatches. Using a higher
PDT guarantees less false positive risk, but it increases the
length of K-mer i.e., K, which in turn increases the running
time. Especially, the homomorphic equality test proce-
dure is significantly affected by K. As shown in Table 2,
the running time of homomorphic equality test has almost
linear relationship with K (Pearson correlation coefficient
of 0.99).
With 10 SNP residues and PDT level 4, K is found
to be 24 (Table 3). In detail, we have 480 24-mers in
the user’s K-mer set and 960 24-mers in the panel K-mer
set. The comparison of the two sets took 603 seconds
(Table 2). Considering that the PDT level 4 with finding
Park et al. BMC Genomics 2019, 20(Suppl 2):188 Page 172 of 185
Table 2 Length K of product K-mers, time needed to encrypt
K-mers and perform equality test to detect SNPs
N PDT K K-mer encryption (ms) equality test (sec)
10 0 10 45 82
10 1 13 56 141
10 2 17 92 300
10 3 20 101 418
10 4 24 119 603
N indicates the number of SNP residues included in the panel. PDT is the mismatch
tolerance, where higher PDT indicates lower false positive risks. The table shows
how the changes in PDT and K affect the running time. The result indicates that
larger K results in longer running time to encrypt and test equality
K-mers is overgenerous, despite the wide genome varia-
tion our work shows that homomorphic encryption can be
computationally feasible to apply on SNP panel scheme.
Panel design guideline for scheme feasibility
The practicality of our scheme relies on shorter K-mers,
andminimizing K is one of our best interest. Asmentioned
in the Method section, K increases as (1) the number of
SNP residues included in panels grow and (2) the higher
PDT level required. The estimated value of K with the
simulated data is shown below (Table 3).
However, the values of K tend to saturate very quickly.
There is ignorable difference among the values of K along
the number of SNP residues from 20 to 100. The saturat-
ing tendency implies that our scheme is likely to be effec-
tive even regarding the panel with large number of SNP
residues. In the data preprocessing stage, we have dis-
carded SNP residues with redundant flanking sequences
to prevent very large number of K . Table 4 shows the num-
ber of discarded SNP residues with respect to the initial
number of SNP residues of panels. Note that the panels do
not drop many SNP residues as their number grows. That
is, with carefully chosen SNP residues not to share the
redundant flanking sequences, some value roughly around
Table 3 The estimated values of K given the number of SNP
residues and PDT levels
N = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
PDT = 0 10 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
1 13 23 23 23 23 23 23 24 24 24
2 17 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
3 20 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 28
4 24 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
PDT indicates mismatch tolerance and N indicates the panel size. The number
inside of table is value of K, which is the minimal length of K-mer for the model.
Usually, larger K requires longer running time and more resources. The table shows
how the changes in PDT and N affect the value of K. The result indicates that K is
positively correlated with both factors respectively
Table 4 The number of discarded and remaining panels given
the original number of SNP residues randomly selected. N
indicates the number of residues in each panel
N = 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Total 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Discarded 0 0 2 3 5 6 7 9 9 13
Remaining 10 20 28 37 45 54 63 71 81 87
Survival rate 1.0 1.0 .93 .93 .90 .90 .90 .89 .90 .87
Discarded indicates the number of residues abandoned during preprocessing.
During preprocessing, the model checks if there are residues having too much
similarity in their neighboring sequences. If two residues have too much similarity in
neighboring sequence contexts, they cannot be distinguished by NGS-seq due to
the limited read length. Table shows that remaining rate is consistent even when N
reaches 100, which indicates that the model can handle panels with large size
without losing too much residues
32 for K would be long enough for any practical number
of SNP residues. The value drops to about 21 when PDT
is not concerned. Considering the trade-offs these param-
eters can provide, any user can fully avail oneself to our
SNP panel scheme under most circumstances.
Conclusions
Although homomorphic encryption has a good potential
for protecting security of data, the encryption method
combined with the current computer systems has not
achieved practical performance to fully utilize the power.
In the field of genomics, the usage of homomorphic
encryption has been mostly limited to querying aggregate
or annotated data, requiring the preprocessing of data.
However, to preprocess the genomic data, the raw genome
sequence should be reveled without adequate protection,
thus more reliable scheme for protecting the genome
information is much needed. In addition, the SNP panel
at the hospital should be protected. In this paper, we pro-
pose a secure SNP panel scheme that protects both the
user’s genome information and the SNP panel information
owned by the hospitals. Since the current homomorphic
encryption technologies are not computationally efficient,
it is not trivial to develop a secure SNP panel scheme that
can be used in reality. By chunking the part of genome
down into K-mers, we have minimized the size of cipher-
text space and overcome the current inefficiency of the
homomorphic encryption. The scheme has yet many fur-
ther possible improvements such as parallel processing
and new algorithmic techniques. We expect our method
to protect the raw sequence from possible threats and
further return the control of genomic data to its owner,
and at the same time protect the hospital’s SNP panel
assets safely. However, we emphasize that our method
shows the feasibility of our scheme. Applying our pro-
posed method to hospitals will certainly require extensive
evaluation and improvement.
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